Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Aug 08, 2023
Africa’s representation in the Summit can be hailed as a statement from the continent: Blind loyalty to one state is no longer the norm
The second Russia-Africa Summit: A continent at a crossroads   From 27-28 July 2023, the second Russia-Africa Summit took place in St Petersburg, Russia. Initially, the Summit was scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in October 2022. However, the Summit got postponed, most likely due to complications emerging from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Despite the presence of 49 out of the 54 African nations, only 17 heads of state and 10 prime ministers attended the Summit. This is in high contrast with the 2019 Summit, where 43 African heads of state and two vice presidents were in attendance, along with 109 ministers and the heads of the African Union (AU) Commission, the African Export–Import Bank and several regional economic communities. Similar to the last summit, the agenda of this year’s summit included technology transfer and development of industry and critical infrastructure in Africa; developing power engineering, agriculture and mineral extraction; and ensuring food and energy security. As the 2023 edition expanded to include a humanitarian element, a Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum also took place in parallel. Additionally, there were exhibitions and a platform for holding business meetings.
The agenda of this year’s summit included technology transfer and development of industry and critical infrastructure in Africa; developing power engineering, agriculture and mineral extraction; and ensuring food and energy security.
At the end of the summit, both parties agreed upon a 74-point Joint Declaration for collaboration on security, trade, and the environment. However, with the frequent use of words such as neo-colonialism, neo-Nazism, neo-fascism, Russophobia, illegal sanctions, import substitution, and traditional values, the document appears to be an implicit African endorsement of Russia’s justification for the Ukraine war. Indeed, the 4,000-plus word document contains multiple statements that are subtly encouraging Africa to back Moscow’s position in the conflict. In the wake of the Summit, ever-deteriorating food security was the key concern for African policymakers. On 17 July, nearly one year after it was signed in Istanbul, Türkiye,  Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to withdraw from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). The BSGI was intended to ease the Russian blockade, thus allowing Ukraine to export grain to Africa. During the summit, Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, and five other leaders who were part of the African Peace Initiative urged President Putin to change his mind. But their request was firmly rejected. Instead, the declaration attributed the entire blame for the food shortages to Western sanctions.
The BSGI was intended to ease the Russian blockade, thus allowing Ukraine to export grain to Africa.
Definitely, the pledge from President Putin to deliver 25,000 to 50,000 tons of free grains to six countries, namely Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, Central African Republic and Eritrea, is encouraging for these poor nations. However, it will not be done immediately but within three or four months—which is too little for a continent of 54 countries.

Decoding the Summit’s achievement

Africa presently imports five times as much as it exports to Russia, resulting in a US$12-billion trade imbalance. Following the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit, President Putin planned to increase Russia’s trade with Africa from roughly US$16.8 billion to US$40 billion annually within five years. Instead, it is now stuck at approximately US$18 billion annually or about 2 percent of all trade on the continent. Moreover, 70 percent of the total trade is restricted to only four countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa. During the first summit, the organisers subsequently boasted of dozens of agreements that were signed, estimated at US$15 billion, but according to some reports, most of those were memorandums of understanding (MoU) and not legally binding. Further, Russia’s direct investment in Africa is currently about 1 percent of the total inflow. Indeed, Russia has waived off a large part of its debt to different African nations worth US$23 billion. This is almost 90 percent of the total African debt to Russia. According to President Putin, this leaves Africa with no more “direct” debts for Russia but some financial obligations. However, given Russian loans to Africa is only a tiny part, this will have minimal impact on this highly indebted continent. Putin added that his government would also provide over US$90 million for development purposes at the request of African countries. Last but not the least, Russia announced that it will spend about US$13 million on “large-scale assistance” to healthcare systems in Africa.
During the first summit, the organisers subsequently boasted of dozens of agreements that were signed, estimated at US$15 billion, but according to some reports, most of those were memorandums of understanding (MoU) and not legally binding.
Indeed, Russia lacks the resources to compete with the United States (US), France, Germany, and Japan or China as a bilateral development donor. However, it does have some cards to play. Last year, it was Africa’s largest source of fertiliser, supplying 500,000 tonnes. It is also a significant power in oil, gas, and mining. Another significant effort by Russia to strengthen ties with Africa is its commitment to education. In 2023, Russia offered a record 4,700 scholarships to African students, a considerable increase from the 1,900 scholarships awarded in 2019. Currently, there are about 35,000 African students in Russia, and about 6,000 of them are on different government scholarships.   The arms trade is the most successful pillar of Russia’s conventional trade with Africa, which is mostly managed by state-controlled Rosoboronexport. Currently, Russia accounts for 44 percent of major arms imports to the continent between 2017 and 2021, surpassing other major players like the US (17 percent), China (10 percent), and France (6.1 percent). Alrosa, which manages diamond projects in Angola and is exploring possibilities in Zimbabwe; Rusal, which mines bauxite in Guinea; and Rosatom, which is constructing a nuclear power station in Egypt, are some other Russian companies with substantial interests in Africa. During the latest summit, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe signed nuclear development contracts with Rosatom.
The arms trade is the most successful pillar of Russia’s conventional trade with Africa, which is mostly managed by state-controlled Rosoboronexport.
In addition to importing weapons, many African nations have hired Russian mercenaries. These Russian mercenaries in Africa work under the Wagner Group, a company connected to Yevgeny Prigozhin, a personal friend of Vladimir Putin. About the future of the Wagner group in Africa, particularly in the backdrop of mutiny by the Wagner group, both Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, in separate statements, have clarified that the group will continue to operate in parts of Africa. And the cameo appearance of Prigozhin during the Summit and his celebratory statements on the coup in Niger make it clear that the Wagner group will continue to expand in Africa.

An evaluation in lieu of a conclusion

Russia has shown a remarkable commitment to engaging with Africa, with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov making three visits to the continent this year. These diplomatic efforts underscore the increasing importance Moscow places on support from African countries. Clearly, Russia wanted to demonstrate its strong support base of many old and loyal allies from Africa in its fight against Western hegemony.  And from that perspective, the gathering served the Russian purpose. As for Africa, except for some of these garden-variety announcements, African leaders have very little  to take home from the event. However, it was also crucial for African leaders to demonstrate to other foreign powers that they were open to hearing various points of view.
Russia wanted to demonstrate its strong support base of many old and loyal allies from Africa in its fight against Western hegemony.
African leaders are used to foreign leaders making bold promises but falling short of keeping them. The low attendance at the Summit may also suggest that African leaders are readjusting their place in the multipolar world. And they realised that in the new age of multilateralism, jeopardising their relationships with either the West or Russia is not the best diplomacy. Almost all African nations are nonaligned, eschewing global power blocs and resenting Western pressure. This is also probably why the heads of state and ministers stayed away but sent their representatives. Africa’s representation in the Summit can be hailed as a statement from the continent: Blind loyalty to one state is no longer the norm. Therefore, Africa’s lack of gains from the conference mirrors Macbeth’s half-truth instruments of darkness: It is neither a simple fact nor a deliberate lie.
Samir Bhattacharya is Senior Research Associate at Vivekananda International Foundation
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